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Case No. 7614 
IN THE: S~UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER T. HARl\1STON, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, 
Deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Respondent, 
AND 
ROGER T. HARlVISTON, as the Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased, HELEN E. GIL-
LIS, MARION EUGENE HARMSTON, 
ROGER T. HARlVISTON, AND FRED 
HARMS TON, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN 
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and 
EDGAR LABRUM and VIDA MURRAY 
LABRUM, his wife, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR A RE-HEARING AND F TIE IE UI]RT THEREOF 
0 :~ T ;~ ~) ·~ , ,-: ·2 J. RULON MORGAN, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
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IN THE S~UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton, 
Deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Respondent, 
AND 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as the Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased, HELEN E. GIL-
LIS, MARION EUGENE HARMSTON, 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, AND .FRED 
HARMS TON, 
Appellants, 
v~. 
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN 
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and 
EDGAR LABRUM and VIDA MURRAY 
LABRUM, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7614 
PETITION F·OR A RE-HEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF' 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Utah: 
COME NOW the defendants in the two above en-
titled causes and move that this Court grant them, and 
each of them, a re-hearing for the following reasons and 
upon the following grounds: 
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1. That in the opinion heretofore handed down in 
the above entitled cause~, this Court erred in overlooking 
and failing to consider the fact that the trial court at the 
time it ordered the foreclosure of the mortgages involved 
in the above entitled action found as a fact, "That Roger 
T. Harmston has been appointed as administrator of 
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, and he 
is now the duly appointed, qualified and acting admin-
istrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased 
(Tr. 101), as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for 
$4,500.00, and (Tr. 117) as to the foreclosure of the 
mortgage for $2,500.00." 
2. That in its opinion heretofore rendered, this 
Court erred in holding that the "trial court erred when 
it admitted parol evidence to prove that the facts were 
different than shown by the record" in the probate pro-
ceeding in Isabelle T. Harmston estate. 
3. That in its opinion heretofore rendered, this 
Court erred in concluding that Wigmore on Evidence, 
3rd Ed., Sec. 2450, Hamill v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 165 
Iowa 266, 145 N.W. 511; Caz-ell v. Cazell, 133 Kan. 766, 
3 Pac. (2d) 479; In Re Burnett's Estate, 11 Cal. (2d) 
259, 79 Pac. (2d) 89; Turley v. Tobin (Texas), 7 S.W. 
( 2d) 949 and State v. Poole, 68 Mont. 178, 216 Pac. 798 
announce any doctrine to the effect that the Trial Court 
erred by admitting evidence touching defendants' claim 
that there was an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston 
in the files in the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton at the 
time of the foreclosure of the two mortgages involved 
in this controversy. 
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-!. This Court erred in concluding that even if the 
evidence had been adn1is8ible in this action, it is doubt-
ful \Yhether it \vas sufficient to uphold the court's order 
to correct the records, in vie\v of the fact that not only 
were the Oath of Office and Letters of Administration 
missing fron1 the files, but there is also lacking any 
record of such filing in 1941 in the book kept for such 
purpose in the office of the County Clerk. 
3. This court erred in holding that "By ad1nitting 
evidence contradicting the record in the probate pro-
ceeding \vithout a direct issue in the pleadings that the 
record \vas not correct, this Court cannot say that the 
rights of appellants were not substantially affected." 
WHEREF.ORE, defendants pray that a re-hearing 
be granted in the above entitled causes to the end that 
the errors above mentioned be corrected and the judg-
ments appealed from be affirmed. 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
KENNETH LABRUM, JEAN CRUMBO 
LABRUM, his wife, EDGAR LABRUM 
and VIDA LABRUM, his wife. 
By J. RULON MORGAN and ELIAS 
HANSEN, 
Their Attorneys. 
CERTIFICATE OF' MERITS 
I, ELIAS HANSEN, one of the attorneys for the 
defendants in the above entitled causes, hereby certify 
that in my opinion there is merit to the foregoing Peti-
tion for a Re-Hearing, and that the record in said causes 
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should be re-examined to the end that the errors above 
mentioned be corrected and the judgment appealed from 
affir1ned. 
(Signed) ELIAS HANSEN 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT IN THE OPINION HERETOFORE HANDED 
DOWN IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE, THIS COURT 
ERRED IN OVERLOOKING AND FAILING TO CONSIDER 
THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT 
ORDERED THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGES 
INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTIONS FOUND 
AS A FACT "THAT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAS BEEN 
APPOINTED AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED, AND HE IS NOW 
THE DULY APPOINTED, QUALIFIED AND ACTING 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. 
HARMSTON, DECEASED (TR. 101), AS TO THE FORE-
CLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE FOR $4500.00, AND (TR. 
117) AS TO THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE 
FOR $2500.00. 
At the outset of this controversy it should be noted 
that in each of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the 
trial court found "That Roger T. Harmston has been 
appointed as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased (Tr. 101 and 117)." In the opinion 
heretofore written that fact has not been mentioned 
and apparently it was overlooked. The fact that the 
trial court has once determined that question is not 
only evidence of the fact that Roger T. Harmston had 
taken the oath of office when the mortgage foreclosure 
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proceedings \Yere had, but as "~e read the authorities, 
such finding of the court is of controlling i1nportance. 
This is not a case "~here the defendant has not been 
served 'vith suinmons. He \vas personally served by 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County. In the summons so 
personally served upon Roger T. Har1nston he is desig-
nated as the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. 
Harn1ston, deceased. Therefore, he must have known 
that he \vas served as the administrator of such estate 
because both the complaint and the sumn1ons designated 
'"Roger T. Harmston, as administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased." If Roger T. Harmston 
had entered his appearance in the mortgage foreclosure 
proceeding and set up as a defense that he was not the 
adlninistrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, 
deceased, and after a hearing was had on that issue the 
Court had found, as it did in the mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings, that Roger T. Harmston was the duly ap-
pointed and qualified administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, we think no one would contend 
that after a lapse of nearly seven years, Roger T. 
Harmston would or could be heard to come in and say 
that the mortgage foreclosure proceeding should be set 
aside because the court records in the matter of the 
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston fail t<? show that Roger 
T. Harmston had taken an oath of office. In these cases, 
Roger T. Harmston did not answer, but for nearly seven 
years he did nothing notwithstanding the defendants 
were in possession of the p-roperty that was foreclosed, 
and a Sheriff's deed issued to the purchaser. Under 
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this state of facts, it is proper to inquire, "Is not the 
defendant bound by the trial court's finding in the mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings as effectively as if he had 
actually appeared and contested the claim that he was 
the qualified administrator of that estate~" As we read 
the authorities, the answer to such question must be in 
the affirmative. The authorities teach that the failure 
of a defendant, who is personally served with summons, 
constitutes admission of the facts alleged in a complaint. 
The law in such particular is thus stated in 49 C.J.S., 
page 359, Sec. 201, "A default has been held to admit the 
capacity in which plaintiff sues, that the defendant is 
the person named in the writ and intended to be sued, 
that he occupies the position or status, or fills the relation 
to others which is alleged in the declaration, and that the 
court has acquired jurisdiction of his person and of the 
cause of action. It also admits the due execution and 
validity of the instrument sued on, that plaintiff's claim 
or demand is just and legal and that defendant has no 
defense to the action." Numerous cases from both state 
and federal courts are collected in footnotes which sup-
port the text. The case of Utah Cred:it Men's Association 
v. Bowman, 38 Utah 326, 113 Pac. 63, is in harmony with 
the text above cited and the cases in support thereof, 
in that it is held that the Clerk of a court may enter 
a judgment without taking evidence when the statute 
so authorizes. It should be observed, however, that no 
claim is made in this case that no evidence was taken to 
establish the fact that Roger T. Harmston had taken 
his oath of office. The evidence is all to the contrary. 
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At the hearing of this case before the trial court, Roger 
T. Harmston did not deny that he had taken the oath of 
office prior to the tiine the 1nortgages \vere ordered fore-
closed. Suppose the defendant, Roger T. Harmston, had 
ans,Yered in the proceeding to foreclose the n1ortgages 
and denied that he had taken an oath of office prior to the 
tin1e of such proceeding and the evidence had been the 
san1e as in this case, and the trial court had found as it 
did in the present case and no appeal had been taken 
attaching the finding that Roger T. Harmston was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, we believe no authority 
can be found that would permit Roger T. Harmston to 
wait nearly seven years and then come into court and 
attack such finding solely upon the ground that the record 
in the matter of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston fails 
to show that he had taken the oath of office. To permit 
this to be done would render judgments which are regular 
on their face to be set aside upon the sole ground that 
they were not supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and would reward a party defendant by per-
mitting him to interpose his claimed defense after a 
lapse of nearly seven years, notwithstanding the defend-
ant has been in possession of the property involved in 
the controversy without any claim by the plaintiffs and 
has sold some of the property to a bona fide innocent 
purchaser. 
If judgments may be set aside under such a state 
of facts, then indeed have judgments, which are in full 
respects regular, lost the sanctity which this and the 
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courts generally have accorded to them. Any examina-
tion of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding would not 
reveal that Roger Harmston had not taJ_{en his oath of 
office, but on the contrary, would show by the court's 
expressed findings that he had taken his oath of office. 
If the opinion heretofore written is to become the 
law of this state, one could not safely rely on a judgn1ent 
regular on its face which had stood for nearly seven years 
without being attacked, but on the contrary must run the 
risk that perchance some of the evidence offered in sup-
port of the judgment was erroneously received and did 
not support the judgment. In many cases where default 
judgments are taken without a reporter taking down the 
evidence, it would be impossible to furnish the necessary 
proof to sustain judgments. It is for that very reason 
that this and other courts have uniformly held that: 
"A judgment upon its face, or the judgment 
roll upon inspection may show: First that the 
Court had jurisdiction of the res and parties; 
·second, that the Court did not have jurisdiction 
of the res or the parties, or Third, the record may 
be silent on the question of jurisdiction." 
"In the first instance, the record supplies all 
the evidence ; on the second instance, the record 
itself shows the judgment void, and in the third 
situation the record importing verity, jurisdic-
tion in the court entering the judgment is pre-
sumed, since every court has the initial right and 
duty to pass upon its own jurisdiction." 
Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271; 75 Pac. (2d) 
157. 
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In this case the judgn1ent on its face affirn1atively 
sho,Ys that the Court had jurisdiction of the res and the 
parties. Indeed no <: lain1 is or could successfully be made 
that the court in the mortgage proceedings 'vas without 
jurisdiction of Roger T. Harn1ston. l-Ie 'vas duly and 
regularly personally served w·ith Sun1n1ons. Nor may 
it be said that the Court 'vas 'vithout jurisdiction of the 
res that is the property covered by the mortgage. A 
lis pendens "~as filed. The property is in Duchesne 
County 'vhere the court was held. District courts have 
jurisdiction of 1nortgage foreclosures. The most that can 
be said is that an examination of the probate proceed-
ings in the Isabelle Harmston Estate fail to show that 
Roger T. Harms ton had taken an oath of office at the 
ti1ne of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The record 
and files in that case do show that Roger T. Harmston 
was appointed administrator and that he had furnished 
a bond as by the Court order directed. Thus, if a sale 
of property had been made or other acts performed by 
Roger T. Harmston as administrator of the Estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, an application of the doctrine an-
nounced by this court in the case of Intermill v. Nash, 
supra that when the record is silent on the question of 
jurisdiction "the record importing verity, jurisdiction 
in the court entering the judgment is presumed, since 
every court has the initial right and duty to pass upon its 
0"\\"71 jurisdiction." This case is, of course, much stronger 
than would be a case where the question of whether or 
not Roger T. Harmston had taken the oath of office was 
directly brought in question in the matter of the estate of 
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Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased. In this case there is 
a total absence of anything in the record of the mort-
gage foreclosure proceeding which shows or tends to show 
that there was anything irregular or defective in those 
proceedings. The records in those proceedings are all 
to the contrary. 
In the ca.se of 0 azell v. 0 azell, 133 Kan. 7 66 ; 3 
Pac. (2d) 479, it is held that the Judge's recollection of 
circumstances of rendering judgment and of the Court's 
intention has force of evidence on question of property 
of nunc pro tunc order to amend a decree of divorce. 
If that be true, certainly the fact that the trial court in 
the proceeding found that Roger T. Harmston was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of Isabelle T. Harmstron, deceased, is evidence, 
and we believe under the authorities conclusive evidence 
that Roger T. Harmstron was such administrator. It 
should be kept in mind in this case tha.t even under plain-
tiff's theory, it is the burden of the Harmstons to secure 
an amendment of the decree of foreclosure to the effect 
that Roger T. Harmston was not the duly appointed, 
qualified and acting administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, at the time of the 
mortgage foreclosure. So long as such findings remain a 
part of the record in those proceedings, the mortgage 
foreclosures must stand because that is the only basis for 
appellants' claim. Obviously, there cannot be a finding 
in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding both ways on that 
question or tha.t Roger T. Harmston was and was not 
the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. In determining 
that question certainly the finding of the trial court in 
the mortgage foreclosure proceeding is evidence of the 
fact, if not, as ""'e contend, conclusive evidence of the fact 
that Roger T. Harn1ston 'vas the duly appointed, quali-
fied and acting administrator of that estate. 
POINT II. 
THAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE 
THAT THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT THAN SHOWN BY 
THE RECORD IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED. 
None of the evidence offered by the defendants in the 
trial of this case was calculated to establish any facts 
that were at variance with the record in the matter of 
the estate ?f Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. The most 
that can pbssibly be said about such evidence is that it 
tended to show that Roger T. Harmston in truth and fact 
had taken an oath of office as administrator of that estate 
and the same had been lost or destroyed. On the con-
trary, what had occurred in the estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, deceased, was collateral to the issue in this 
case. 
The only issue in this case was whether or not the 
trial court in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings had 
jurisdiction to find that Roger T. Harmstrom was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of Isabelle T. Harmstrom's estate at the time of the 
foreclosure of the mortgages. The evidence offered by the 
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defendants was offered to establish the fact that the trial 
court not only had jurisdiction to find such fact, but 
that such finding was not erroneous, but was in accord 
with the fact. It was the plaintiffs who were attacking 
the judgments of the court in the mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings and in furtherance of such attempt, sought 
to show by the absence of any record of an oath of office 
in the probate proceedings. What Roger T. Harmston 
sought to show, and in order to prevail must show, is 
that the trial court erroneously found in the mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings that Roger T. Harmston was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased and apparently 
because of such error, the trial court was without juris-
diction to decree a foreclosure of the property covered 
by the mortgages. In passing, it may be observed that 
even if, contrary to our contention, the trial court erron-
eously found that Roger T. Harmston was such admini-
strator, such error would not deprive the· trial court of 
jurisdiction. It is so held by this court in the case of 
Atwood v. Cox, Utah 437; 55 Pac. (2) 377; where numer-
ous authorities are collected. 
Even if this were a proceeding in the matter of the 
estate of Isabelle Harms ton, deceased, involving the 
validity of some act of an appointed administrator, the 
fact that the oath of office was absent from the files would 
not render the act invalid. U.C.A. 1943, 104-1-7 pro-
vides: 
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··No order or decree affecting the title to real 
property heretofore or hereafter 1nade in any pro:-
bate or guardianship n1atter, shall be held to be 
void at the suit or instance of any person clain1ing 
adversely to the title of the decedent or ward, or 
under a title not derived fron1 or through the de-
cedent or 'vard, on account of any want of notice, 
defect or irregularity in the proceedings, or of 
any defect or irregularity in such order or decree, 
if it appears that, before the order or decree was 
entered, the executor, administrator or guardian, 
as the case may be, was appointed by a court of 
con1petent jurisdiction upon such notice as was 
or may be prescribed by law; and in a probate 
matter in 'vhich a competent court shall have ap-
pointed an executor, administrator or guardian 
upon due notice, no objection to any subsequent 
order or decree therein can be taken by any per-
son claiming under the deceased or under the 
ward, on account of any such want of notice·, de-
fect or irregularity, in any other manner than 
on direct application to the same court, made at 
any time before distribution, or on appeal." 
U.C.A., 1943, 104-1-8 provides: 
"An object to any paper, petition, decree or 
order in any probate or guardianship matter, for 
an erroneous or defective statement or determina-
tion of any fact necessary to jurisdiction which ac-
tually existed, or for an omission to find or state 
any such fact in such paper, petition, decree or 
order, is available only on direct application to the 
same court, or on appeal." 
The statutes above cited are construed in the cases 
of Barrett v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574; 106 Pac. 5·22 and 
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Erickson v. McCullough, 91 Utah 159; 63 Pac. (2d) 109. 
This court has also held in the case of Hatch v. The Lucky 
Bill Mining Co., 25 Utah 405; 71 Pac. 865 that where the 
, directors of a corporation have taken an oath of office 
but neglected to file the same as by law required "the 
irregularity is not of sufficient importance to authorize 
a court of equity to set aside the proceedings (the levy-
ing of an assessrnen t) and especially so where, as in this 
case, no one appears to have been mislead or injured 
thereby." To the same effect is the case of Jones v. 
Bonanza Mining & Milling Co. et al, 32 Utah 440; 91 Pac. 
273. 
While the foregoing statutes are not directly in point, 
they do show that the legislative branch of government 
and the courts of equity are very reluctant to set aside 
decrees of courts, especially courts of general jurisdiction 
because of some irregularity or omission not going to 
jurisdiction. If as the authorities just cited hold, irregu-
larities or omissions invalidating title to real estate may 
not be maintained "in any other manner than on direct 
application to the same court, made at any time before 
distribution or on appeal" where an administrator has 
been appointed upon due notice, then for much stronger 
reasons the title to real estate may not be successfully 
attacked where, as here, the court found that Roger T. 
Harmston was the duly appointed, qualified and acting 
adn1inistrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston at the 
time the decrees foreclosing the mortgages were entered. 
In its opinion, the Court seems to attach considerable 
importance to the fact that our statute, (U.C.A. 1943, 102-
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5-l) requires the clerk to record letters of administration 
to ,,·hich the oath of office is attached in books to be kept 
by hin1 in his office for that purpose, but no such record 
\Vas made. Of course, if, as the evidence shows, the oath 
of office disappeared soon after it was taken and before 
a record \vas made thereof, it is of no special significance 
that it does not appear of record. Obviously, when the 
letters of adn1inistration and the oath of office attached 
thereto disappeared, the same could not be recorded. 
IJOINT III. 
THAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED 
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT WIGMORE 
ON EVIDENCE, 3rd Ed. Sec. 2450, HAMILL v. SCHLITZ 
BREWING CO., 165 Iowa 266; 145 N.W. 511; CAZELL v. 
CAZELL, 133 Kan. 766; 3 Pac. (2d) 479; IN RE BURNETT'S 
ESTATE, 11 Cal. (2d) 259; 79 Pac. (2d) 89; TURLEY v. TOBIN 
(TEXAS) 7 S.W. (2d) 949 AND STATE v. POOLE, 68 Mont. 
178, 216 Pac. 798 ANNOUNCE ANY DOCTRINE TO THE EF-
FECT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE TOUCHING DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT 
THERE WAS AN OATH OF OFFICE OF ROGER T. HARMS-
TON IN THE FILES IN THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. 
HARMSTON AT THE TIME OF THE FORECLOSURE OF 
THE TWO MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTRO-
VERSY. 
We have carefully examined the foregoing authori-
ties and cases, but as we read them they are not applic-
able to the facts in this case. In none of those cases does 
it appear that in the case immediately before the court, 
the validity of which is being brought in question, is there 
a finding, which if true, defeats the claim that the court 
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was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. In 
this case there is a total absence of any evidence of any 
infirmaties in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
In order to find any evidence to support appellant's 
claim, he must not only go outside of the mortgage fore-
closure proceedings, but he must ignore or strike down 
the finding that Roger T. Harmston was the duly appoint-
ed qualified and acting administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. Looking solely to the 
failure of the records in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate 
to show that Roger T. Harms ton had taken an oath of 
office and the express finding in the mortgage fore-
closure proceedings that he had taken the 'oath of office 
prior to the time of the entry of the decree of foreclosure, 
it would seem that the latter is entitled to at least greater 
weight than former. 
The cases and authorities cited in the opinion are 
founded on the proposition that a judgment should be full 
and complete within itself and that one who seeks relief 
under a judgment must first secure a full and complete 
judgment. That doctrine has no application here because 
in this case there is no infirmity in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. They are full and complete in every particu-
lar. The appellants and not the respondents are seeking 
to have the judgment changed. If the judgment in the 
mortgage foreclosure proceeding, after a lapse of nearly 
seven years, may attack and have held for naught the 
findings of fact in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
because of a claim th~t there was not proper evidence 
to support the same by reason of the failure of the record 
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in the probate proceedings to reveal that Roger T. Harm-
ston had taken an oath of office in that estate, there is 
no reason "\Yhy the n1ortgage foreclosure proceeding n1ay 
not be attacked because of a failure of some other probate 
proceeding record through 'vhich Isabelle Harmston ac-
quired title fails to show that the administrator thereof 
failed to take the oath of office and thus cast upon the 
person claiming title through a mortgage foreclosure 
the burden of showing that such an oath of office was 
taken notwithstanding the court in such other probate . 
proceedings had found that an oath of office had been 
taken. 
~Ioreover the great weight of authority as we find 
then1 is against those cited in the opinion heretofore 
rendered in this case. 
The matter of the proof of proceedings in courts 
is discussed in Freeman on Judgments-Fifth Edition, 
page 2145. It is there stated that in some states it is 
necessary to re-establish a judgment-roll before it may 
be admitted in evidence, but then goes on to say: This 
view is in conflict with that expressed by Mr. Greenleaf 
in his work on Evidence, in which he lays down the follow-
ing rule: "If the record is lost and is ancient, its exist-
ence and contents may sometimes be presumed, but 
whether it be ancient or recent, after proof of the loss, 
its contents may be proved, like any other document, by 
any secondary evidence where the case does not from its 
nature disclose the existence of other and better evi-
dence." In a footnote to the text, it is stated that the rule 
stated by Greenleaf is beyond doubt sustained by the 
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weight of authority. Numerous cases from both federal 
and state courts are cited in footnote Number 15. We have 
examined such cases and they support the text. It would 
extend this brief to an unreasonable length to review all 
of the cases there cited and to do so would probably not 
substantially add to respondents' position because in 
those cases, as well as those cited by the court in its 
opinion, the situation presented to the court was one 
in which a judgment was relied upon and sought to be 
enforced in the proceeding directly brought in question. 
No such question is here presented. Here, as we have 
repeatedly pointed out, the decrees of foreclosures were 
free from any and all infirmity. In order to make out a 
case casting any question of the validity of the decrees 
of foreclosure, resort was had to an entirely different 
proceeding from the one brought in question. In our in-
vestigation, we have been unable to find a case or other 
authority where that doctrine has been applied to facts 
similar to those here involved. Indeed the trial court 
having found in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding 
that Roger T. Harmston was at the time of the mortgage 
foreclosure proceeding the duly appointed qualified and 
acting administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harms-
ton, deceased, it would seem to be a useless proceeding 
to have the court again make such a finding if indeed 
the respondents have such an interest as will entitle them 
to 1naintain such a proceeding in light of the fact that 
they have already such a finding and of the further fact 
that Roger T. Harmston wa.s such administrator of that 
estate at the time of the trial. Certain it is that the trial 
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court could not \Yell1nake a finding that Roger T. Ha.rins-
ton \Yas not such administrator until and unless it first 
set aside the finding in the 1nortgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings that Harn1ston \Yas surh administrator. The law 
abhors inconsistent findings as bet,Yeen the same parties 
"~here there is involved the sa1ne property rights. 
POINT I\T. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT EVEN IF 
TIIE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN THIS AC-
TION, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO UPHOLD THE COURT'S ORDER TO CORRECT THE 
RECORDS, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NOT ONLY 
WERE THE OATH OF OFFICE AND LETTERS OF ADMINI-
STRATION MISSING FROM THE FILES, BUT THERE IS 
ALSO LACKING ANY RECORD OF SUCH FILING IN 1941 
IN THE BOOK KEPT FOR SUCH PURPOSE IN THE OFFICE 
OF THE COUNTY CLERK. 
We have in part at least discussed the question which 
we wish to raise under this heading. 
The only evidence which lends any support to the 
claim that Roger T. Harmston did not take an oath of 
office is the fact that the record of the probate proceed-
ings fail to show that such oath of office was taken. 
Roger T. Harmston, though present in court at the time 
of the hearing, did not deny that he had taken the oath 
of office. The evidence of Rulon Morgan is that he had 
the files in the probate proceedings before him at the time 
of the hearing of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. 
The clerk and his two assistants all testified that when he 
wrote a letter, such as the one written to Mr. Morgan 
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stating that an oath of office had been taken by Mr. 
Harmston, he, the clerk, always had before him the record 
concerning which he_wrote and what is of greater weight, 
if not conclusive, is the fact that the trial court found that 
Roger T. Harmstron was the duly appointed, qualified 
and acting administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmstron when the mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
·were had. In addition thereto, is the fact that notwith-
standing Roger T. Harmston was sued as such admini-
strator, personally served with summons as such adn1ini-
strator, yet he failed to answer or deny such fact until 
nearly seven years after the foreclosure decree was 
entered. 
In light of these facts, some of which were apparently 
overlooked because they are not mentioned in the opinion, 
we most earnestly urge that this cause be reconsidered. 
It seems, to say the least, unlikely that an attorney-at-law 
w_ould be so forgetful of his duties as to fail to assure 
hi1nself that an oath of office had been taken by the per-
son against whom suit is being brought to foreclose a 
n1ortgage executed by one who is deceased, or that he 
would testify, as did Mr. Morgan in this case, that the 
oath of office was in the files at the time of the entry 
of the decree of foreclosure. It seems equally improbable 
that the trial judge would be so neglectful of his duties 
as to find as a fact that Roger T. Harmston was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, if such were 
not the fact. So also Mr. Harmston was personally served 
with summons as the administrator of the estate of Mrs. 
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Har1nston on May 13, 19-!1, yet he paid no attention to 
the fact that he \Vas so served and that the Farmers and 
~Ierchants Bank has been in possession of the Inortgaged 
property and collected the rents and profits therefro1n 
since l\Iarch 12, 19-!2, when it secured a Sheriff's Deed 
until the present action \Vas brought. If such evidence is 
not sufficient to show that an oath of office was taken 
by Harmston, then indeed have judgments and decrees 
lost the sanctity which, as we have heretofore pointed 
out, have been most zealously upheld by the authorities 
generally, as well as by this court. 
POINT V. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "BY ADMIT-
TING EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING THE RECORD IN THE 
PROBATE PROCEEDING WITHOUT A DIRECT ISSUE IN 
THE PLEADINGS THAT THE RECORD WAS NOT COR-
RECT, THIS COURT CANNOT SAY THAT THE RIGHTS 
OF APPELLANTS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT-
ED." 
While it is true that there is no direct issue in the 
pleadings that the record in the probate proceedings 
were not correct, it is also true that there was no occasion 
to try out in this proceeding the matters involved in the 
probate proceedings. In order to show that the court 
was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of fore-
closure, the appellants offered the record in the probate 
proceedings to show that Roger T. Harmston had not 
taken an oath of office and the respondents offered evi-
dence that he had taken an oath of office. As we under-
stand the law it is not the function of pleadings to raise 
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issues as to the admissibility of evidence to support or 
defeat an issue in a case. The issue in this case was 
whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter the 
decree of foreclosure and what occurred in the probate 
proceedings was not and could not well be made an issue 
by the pleadings. It is elementary that evidence need 
not be pleaded. Moreover, if it were necessary that an 
issue be made in the pleadings of such nature it was the 
appellants and not the respondents duty to raise such 
issue. They were the ones who brought into these cases 
the matter of the failure of Roger T. Harmston to take an 
oath of office. If it were necessary to make an issue in 
the pleadings upon that question that burden was on the 
appellants as they were the ones who sought relief from 
the mortgage foreclosures. That being so, the appellants 
may not be heard to complain if they failed to allege the 
facts necessary to have the foreclosure proceedings set 
aside. The only pleading required of the respondents was 
a general denial of the allegations relied upon by the ap-
pellants for relief. If, as we have heretofore contended, 
the rights of the appellants were lawfully foreclosed, 
then, of course, the rights of the appellants may not be 
said to be affected, because if the foreclosure proceedings 
are to be sustained, the appellants are without any rights. 
We submit that a rehearing should be granted to the 
end that the cause be re-examined and the errors abo:ve 
mentioned be corrected and the judgment appealed from 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Responde:nts 
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